Since the end of World War II, successful developing countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and, more recently China, have leveraged industrial policies—notably trade measures and subsidies—to achieve economic development. However, these industrial policy tools often conflict with the rules of international trade established under the World Trade Organization (WTO law), which aims to minimize government interference and reduce trade distortions. Paradoxically, such regulatory constraints hinder the development aspirations of many countries. Meanwhile, major global economies, including the United States, China, and the European Union, have revived industrial policies to support their key industries, such as semiconductors and electric vehicles, in contravention of WTO law. Some countries, such as the United States, have also attempted to justify WTO-inconsistent measures by invoking the national security defense under GATT Article XXI. This article explores the inherent conflict between industrial policy and international trade law, analyzes the resurgence of industrial policy in the advanced economies, examines the feasibility of national security defense, and argues for regulatory reforms to reconcile these tensions.

In October 2019, Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA), a Venezuelan state owned oil and natural gas company, filed a complaint against the trustee and the collateral agent of PDVSA’s bondholders, alleging that certain bonds due in 2020 issued in exchange for the defaulted bonds due in 2017 are null and void ab initio. The main cause of action was that the 2020 bonds had been issued in violation of the provisions of the Venezuelan Constitution. This contention was advanced notwithstanding that the 2020 bonds provide that “all matters arising out of or relating in any whatsoever” to the instruments shall be governed by the law of New York. At the same time, New York’s conflict-of-laws statute contains a rule providing that “[t]he local law of the issuer’s jurisdiction … governs … the validity of a security,” which was discovered and invoked by the (sub-)sovereign debtor as a relatively uncommon ground for the repudiation of its external debt. The federal district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ contention by adopting a narrow reading of the term “validity” within the meaning of New York’s conflict of-laws rule, whereas the Court of Appeals of New York State showed an opposite but nuanced interpretation by concluding that Venezuelan law does govern the validity of the PDVSA’s bonds, but with the repeated caveats that the consequences of eventual invalidity remain to be governed by New York law. The present article examines the governing law of sovereign debt issued allegedly in contravention of the sovereign debtor’s constitutional and budgetary constraints, with special reference to the case brought by PDVSA before New York courts. It aims to identify the role of private international law as a device for global governance by which the application of a sovereign’s budgetary disciplines is ensured to serve the public policy objectives of sovereign debt sustainability.

This paper examines whether aiding and abetting liability for corporate involvement in human rights abuses is a cognizable claim under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS). Though the ATS has potential to serve as a powerful mechanism of civil redress for violations of international law, the Supreme Court has increasingly narrowed its scope in recent decades. As a result, critical questions remain unresolved regarding the cognizability of certain claims under the statute. This paper focuses primarily on Doe I et al. v. Cisco Systems, Inc. et al.,, a case emerging from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. In January 2026, following a petition by Cisco Systems, Inc., the Supreme Court granted certiorari, agreeing to review the issue of whether corporations may be held liable for aiding and abetting in violations of international law under the ATS. This paper identifies and analyzes the two competing analytical frameworks the Court may employ in addressing this question. The First Route argues the law of nations, as applied to the ATS, is a developing body of law. Under this approach, aiding and abetting is a well-defined and universally accepted norm of international law and therefore a cognizable claim under the ATS. The Second Route argues that the ATS was enacted with congressional intent to limit its application to a narrow set of historically recognized offenses against the law of nations. Under this approach, recognition of additional causes of action, notably aiding and abetting, raises significant foreign policy and separation-of-powers concerns. In applying these frameworks to the case of Cisco, this paper clarifies the stakes of the court’s impending decision and evaluates its broader implications for corporate accountability.