Latest Issue: Vol. 40, Issue 2

Symposium: AI, the New Law Firm Attorney: Artificial Intelligence Entering the Legal Profession

Volume 40, Issue 1

Reds, Whites, and Sulfites: Examining Different Organic Wine Regulation Practices in the United States and the European Union

By: Puszka, Ryan | January 1, 2020

Abstract: This note examines the history of regulation within the organic wine industry in the U.S. and the E.U. and explores the motivations behind the production of organic wine in these two regions. The variance in the historical significance of wine between these two regions is reflected in the contemporary differences between the two regions’ rules for organic wine certification. In 2012, the U.S. and the E.U. entered into a comprehensive organic equivalency agreement that covered nearly all organic agricultural products but due to significant differences in the two regions’ regulatory schemes concerning the inclusion of added sulfites in wine, the equivalency agreement did not extend to wine. This lack of organic equivalency between two of the world’s largest producers and consumers of wine has resulted in a number of labeling difficulties in the international wine market and consequentially, has resulted in economic inequities, which disincentivize organic viticulture. These difficulties have trickled down to the consumer and resulted in both confusion and a general distrust for organically certified wines, further harming the reputation of organic wines. This article proposes the creation of a private international agency for certifying organic wine, mirroring the Demeter Standard for biodynamic products. This private certifying agency would provide greater transparency to consumers and a more economically attractive and streamlined regulatory process for wine producers who are considering organic viticulture.

Do You Accept These Cookies? How the General Data Protection Regulation Keeps Consumer Information Safe

By: Chorpash, Jayne | January 1, 2020

Abstract: This note examines the General Data Protection Regulation implemented in the EU in 2018. The GDPR was the result of a long history of data privacy laws that have been met with varying levels of success. While the GDPR has retained many characteristics that have made past privacy laws successful, it has also made some important changes. Most notably, the GDPR gives generous rights to consumers to guard and protect their data, which is of growing concern in light of how easy it is to share information in our modern age. Additionally, the GDPR has a much broader territorial scope, covering data processing activities related to either the offering of goods or services to EU data subjects or the monitoring of their behaviors within the EU. As a result, the hefty fines imposed for violating the GDPR have forced many companies to comply quickly. This note continues by comparing the GDPR’s regulations with those of the United States and concludes that, although there may be more upfront barriers and costs to adopt regulations as stringent as the GDPR, overall, the GDPR is superior to privacy laws in the United States. Finally, this note concludes by briefly examining the future of the GDPR, as well as the potential for GDPR-like regulations to be adopted in the United States.

The Indian Securities Fraud Class Action: Is Class Arbitration the Answer?

By: Fitzpatrick, Brian T.,Thomas, Randall S. | January 1, 2020

Abstract: In 2013, India enacted one of the most robust private enforcement regimes for securities fraud violations in the world. Unlike in most other countries, Indian shareholders can now initiate securities fraud lawsuits on their own, represent all other defrauded shareholders unless those shareholders affirmatively opt out, and collect money damages for the entire class. The only thing missing is a better financing mechanism: unlike the United States, Canada, and Australia, India does not permit contingency fees, so class action lawyers cannot front the costs of litigation in exchange for collecting a percentage of what they recover. On the other hand, the 2013 law enacted a public financing regime for securities fraud class actions and it is possible third-party financing will be permitted; these mechanisms may make up some of the loss in effectiveness caused by the lack of contingency fees. It is still too early to tell. Yet, commentators are very pessimistic that the Indian securities fraud class action will do much good because the Indian court system is glacially slow. For example, it takes over six years on average to resolve some civil appeals. The solution to this problem in the 2013 law was to channel the securities fraud class action to a special tribunal, the National Company Litigation Tribunal (“NCLT”). Yet, this type of solution has been tried before in India: special tribunals tend to quickly take on the negative characteristics of the general courts. This may be why very few securities fraud lawsuits have been filed since the 2013 law was enacted. We propose a different solution to the problem of the Indian court system: class arbitration. As we explain, although class arbitration is not perfect, it may better facilitate robust private enforcement than the Indian court system.