The president’s power over global financial transactions has become one of the most potent tools in America’s foreign policy arsenal. Since the outbreak of World War I, presidents have frequently employed financial instruments to coerce or punish foreign actors. But it was President Biden’s employment of financial weaponry in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine that represented the most complex and far-reaching exercise of presidential power in global finance. From weakening the Russian central bank’s access to the dollar market, to cutting off key Russian financial institutions from American lenders, to deplatforming Russian entities from the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), Biden undertook a multipronged effort to use global finance as a means to punish, deter, and hobble the Kremlin’s aggression. This paper explores the history, practice, and future of the president’s use of global finance to achieve foreign policy victories. I trace the history of this practice from Woodrow Wilson through the first term of Donald Trump’s presidency. I explain how this history ultimately provided the runway for Biden to launch an unprecedented financial attack on Russia in 2022, which constituted the apex of presidential power in global finance. I also detail how this power may have peaked with the Biden Administration, as both domestic and external factors will likely diminish the president’s power in this realm over the years to come.

The recent decade has witnessed an increase of cases in which foreign investors have challenged host states’ taxation measures in international investment arbitrations, arguing that they violated investment treaty protection standards including fair and equitable treatment (“FET”). After conducting a close examination of cases involving taxation-related claims in international investment arbitration, this article reveals that in the cases involving the host states’ taxation measures, the ability of investors to invoke FET claims is very limited, and the chances of foreign investors succeeding in protecting their investment interests through FET claims are much lower compared to other types of non-taxation-related claims. Tribunals have generally extended uneven deference toward host states’ taxation power, which renders investment treaty protection less meaningful, even insufficient, for foreign investors to protect their interests from host states’ abuse of taxation measures. In addition, due to the generic and vague features of the FET standard, different tribunals have taken a diverging approach to conduct the FET analysis which caused more confusion and uncertainty. To address this situation, this article proposes a new “Balanced Three-Fold” approach to harmonize the chaos in existing jurisprudence: for taxation-related FET analysis, first, the tribunal could assess whether there is a clear prior commitment to taxation stabilization from the host state to the investor through stabilization arrangements or other assurances or guarantees; if there is no prior commitment, then assessment can turn to substantive FET sub-standards and procedural FET sub-standards to decide whether the taxation related claims can be supported or not.

Chelsea Football Club, Sean Baker’s Academy Award-winning film “Anora,” and billionaire parties in St. Barth’s: the rapid rise of Russian capital since the collapse of the Soviet Union has permeated international popular culture and underscores the modern global economy. However, Vladimir Putin’s invasions into Ukraine in 2014 and 2022 have caused the international community — particularly the West — to sanction Russia, challenging its place in an increasingly globalized supply chain, and harkening anti-Russian sentiment not seen since the Cold War. In response to sanctions, Russia has begun nationalizing Western assets left behind within its borders, leaving company owners scrambling to reclaim their assets. Through an examination into customary international law, bilateral investment treaties, and potential Russian interests and counterarguments, this paper will seek to outline potential legal remedies for property owners whose assets have been nationalized by Russia. This analysis will attempt to outline the limits of bilateral investment treaties when working with a country who has no intentions of honoring these treaties — or any standards of fair and equitable treatment — and will posit a unique path forward for companies looking to get their assets out of Russia.