Robust discussions on standing investment courts are currently taking place at various fora. In particular, negotiations to include bilateral investment courts in IIAs are in full swing and leading to the creation of such courts. On the other hand, negotiation for a multilateral investment court has yet to start. Even if negotiation begins, it is not clear how long it will take and whether it will indeed lead to a successful conclusion. As such, for a significant amount of time in the future, it is bilateral investment courts that states administer to resolve investment disputes. Bilateral investment courts, however, will further deepen the already existing fragmentation of international investment law. They will be unable to issue harmonized and consistent jurisprudence for similar or essentially the same legal issues. In addition, they will more easily stoke sovereignty infringement claims by domestic critics. If legitimacy enhancement is the ultimate objective of the present ISDS reform discussions, it will only be achieved through a multilateral court. This is the only alternative to address the basic concern that has prompted the ISDS reform debates in general and the court proposals in particular. Global efforts should be mobilized to initiate and conclude negotiations for the establishment of a multilateral court as promptly as possible. In the interim, current negotiations to create and adopt bilateral courts should be suspended.
Contrary to the Court of Justice for the European Union’s decision in the Asnef-Equifax case, in a world of big data, it is inefficient and ineffective to treat EU competition law and EU data protection law as entirely separate legal considerations. Reevaluating this stance is critical in sectors where customer data is highly sensitive, and therefore highly valuable to those who steal it, particularly for the financial and healthcare sectors. Looking forward, companies that store and use biometric data will have to be similarly scrutinized. To correct this problem, the EU has numerous paths it can take: (a) continue as is, treating competition and data protection as separate legal considerations, (b) enact a new body of regulatory law to specifically deal with data protection and competition, or (c) begin using existing competition law, specifically Article 101 of the TFEU, to address data protection concerns. This paper will argue that to best serve the interests of all relevant players – government, businesses, and consumers – option (c) is the optimal choice. Additionally, in implementing this change, the EU can use the FRAND patent and competition law precedence in devising a new data protection and competition framework.
European football is undergoing rapid changes spurred on by enormous investments from around the globe. Although regulations exist to curtail teams buying their way to success, foreign investors have become ingenious at circumventing Financial Fair Play rules. The European football governing body needs to reevaluate existing rules and strengthen them by looking to outside examples. This article analyzes the current regulations established by the governing bodies of European football and details how foreign investors are able to circumvent these regulations. Further, this article articulates potential solutions to the current Financial Fair Play rules and how the spirit of the current rules can be ultimately realized.