Over the past two decades, corporate governance reforms have emerged as a central focus of corporate law in countries across the development spectrum. Various legal scholars studying these reform efforts have engaged in a vigorous debate about whether globalization will lead to convergence of corporate governance laws toward one model of governance: namely the Anglo-American, dispersed shareholder model, or whether existing national characteristics will thwart convergence. Despite rapid economic growth and reforms in developing countries such as India, the legal literature discussing this debate primarily focuses on developed economies. This Article examines recent corporate governance reforms in India as a case study for evaluating the competing claims on global convergence of corporate governance standards currently polarizing the field of corporate law. This Article seeks to make a fresh contribution to the convergence debate by examining the implications of India’s corporate governance reform efforts. It contends that the Indian experience demonstrates that traditional theories predicting convergence, or a lack thereof fail to fully capture the trajectory of actual corporate governance reforms. India’s reform efforts demonstrate that while corporate governance rules may converge on a formal level with Anglo- American corporate governance norms, local characteristics tend to prevent reforms from being more than merely formal. India’s inability to effectively implement and enforce its extensive new rules corroborates the argument that comprehensive convergence is limited, and that the transmission of ideas from one system to another is highly complex and difficult, requiring political, social and institutional changes that cannot be made easily.